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This paper shows that when agents on both sides of the market are heterogeneous,
varying in their costs of investment, ex ante investments by ﬁrms and workers (or buyers
and sellers more generally) may be too high when followed by stochastic matching and
bargaining over quasi-rents. The overinvestment is caused by the fact that low-cost agents,
by investing more, can increase the value of their outside option and thus shift rent away
from high-cost investors. Numerical simulations show that overinvestment can occur given
parameter values calibrated to OECD labour markets.
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1. Introduction
According to Sicherman (1991), some 40% of US workers have more education than is needed for the job they do,
whereas 16% are underqualiﬁed (Vaisey, 2006 reports similar ﬁgures). This ﬁnding might suggest that the private return to
education is low. In fact, the opposite is the case. For example Carneiro et al. (2003) estimate that the average annual return
to college for a randomly selected US citizen is 18.7%. How can these two facts be reconciled?
The standard reconciliation, following Spence (1973), is that education does not so much create human capital as signal
otherwise unobservable productivity. This paper develops an alternative explanation. Since education widens employment
opportunities, it increases bargaining power even in jobs for which it is unnecessary. For example, a ﬁrm may hire an
available MBA graduate because ﬁnding a suitable candidate without an MBA involves delay. To make such an appointment,
the pay must reﬂect what the MBA is worth to ﬁrms for which it does have value; i.e. the ﬁrm may have to pay the MBA
candidate the value of his “outside option.” Acquiring an MBA might therefore be privately beneﬁcial, even if that individual
then takes a job for which it is unnecessary. As a result, there is a tendency to overinvestment from a social perspective,
but the speciﬁc mechanism differs from the standard signalling story; overinvestment occurs because it enables the investor
to capture rents, rather than being used as a signalling device.
The model developed in this paper builds on a growing literature on ex ante investments followed by stochastic match-
ing, with the rent from the match divided by ex-post bargaining (Acemoglu, 1996, 1997; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; and
Masters, 19981). The bargaining protocols studied in these papers allow for agents to have outside options, either in the
form of a return to the search process or in switching between partners. Nevertheless, in these papers, unlike in ours, out-
side options do not generate overinvestment. This is because they do not bind in equilibrium, or indeed for small deviations
✩ We are grateful to three referees, the Editor, Daron Acemoglu, John Black, Bhaskar Dutta, John Hardman-Moore, Alan Manning, Chris Pissarides, Kevin
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1 Masters (1998) claims that when the outside option takes the form of switching between partners, the outcome is eﬃcient. De Meza and Lockwood
(2006) show that there is an error in this argument: if switching is costless, as in Masters, there are a continuum of investment equilibria between the
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hold-up problem i.e. only receives half the return on their investment, implying underinvestment from a social viewpoint.2
However, in all these contributions, agents are assumed homogeneous.3 In this paper, we show that if agents are hetero-
geneous, differing in investment costs, outside options may become binding in equilibrium, and thus may provide incentives
for overinvestment. This works as follows. We assume that a fraction of ﬁrms and workers have a low cost of investment
(low-cost agents) and the complementary fraction have a high cost of investment (high-cost agents). Suppose further for
simplicity that high-cost agents do not invest in equilibrium, because the cost of investment is too high. With suﬃcient
search frictions, a low-cost agent will match with a high-cost agent (non-assortative matching). Assume further, for sim-
plicity, that investments are perfectly complementary: so, the ex ante investment by the low-cost agent is completely
unproductive in a non-assortative match. Nevertheless, an investment by the low-cost agent enhances his bargaining power
in such a match by creating – or increasing the value of – a binding outside option, because the investment increases the
value of a match with another low-cost agent who has also invested. This rent-transfer opportunity is privately proﬁtable
but not socially beneﬁcial.
Note that overinvestment requires “intermediate” match frictions.4 For rent transfer to be relevant, match frictions must
be high enough to ensure that non-assortative matches occur in equilibrium, but not so high that the outside option of a
low-cost agent does not bind in these matches. For the case of a CES revenue function, we provide a complete characterisa-
tion of the set of parameter values for which overinvestment can occur. Interestingly, overinvestment is possible for a range
of match friction values consistent with average unemployment durations in OECD countries.5 Numerical simulations also
indicate that this set tends to be larger, the higher the proportion of low-cost agents, and the lower the returns to scale in
the revenue function.
The empirical implications of the matching model and signalling theory overlap to some extent. According to both,
education burns up real resources in the process of redistributing income, implying the private return is higher than the
social return. This is consistent with the well-known empirical ﬁnding that higher education yields substantial private
returns, yet in cross-country studies, the effect on GDP is weak.6 In Section 4, it is argued that our model, in some respects,
ﬁts the facts better than does signalling theory.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 derives the overinvestment
results, Section 4 discusses the empirical implications of the model, Section 5 discusses related literature, and Section 6
concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Preliminaries
There are two types of agents: ﬁrms and workers. Both are inﬁnitely lived. Time t is discrete, with a period length of ,
and runs inﬁnitely forward and back, and all agents have a discount factor δ = e−r . The following events occur in each
period t . First, a measure λi of both workers and ﬁrms of type i = h, l enter the pool of unmatched, with λh + λl = 1. Then,
on entering, each agent chooses how much to invest. A type i agent has investment cost ci(e) = cie, i = h, l and ch > cl ,
all e. So, h-types have a higher cost of investment than l-types.
Then, a fraction 0 < a < 1 of the measure of as yet unmatched ﬁrms and workers, are randomly matched with each
other.7 That is, every worker is matched with a ﬁrm (and vice versa) with probability a.8 A ﬁrm which has invested ew
2 A related partial-equilibrium literature initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) studies investments that are to some degree
relationship speciﬁc and undertaken post matching. In Hart (1995, p. 37), the marginal return to investment is plausibly assumed higher in the relationship
for which it is designed than outside it. The result is underinvestment for familiar hold up reasons. A further modiﬁcation is to assume the nature of
the investment is discretionary. For an agent with a binding outside option, partner-speciﬁc investment has no payoff whereas investment that enhances
productivity with outsiders yields a private return but no social beneﬁt. So if ﬁrms can choose the type of investment, as, for example, in Watson (2002,
p. 178, Q2), they underinvest in partner-speciﬁc capital but overinvest in capital that will never be productively used. As the gross output of the economy
is below the socially optimal level it seems reasonable to characterise the outcome as underinvestment. In the model of this paper the gross output of the
economy exceeds the socially optimal level.
3 In Acemoglu (1996), one side of the market – the workers – are allowed to be heterogeneous, but only as part of a comparative statics exercise in
order to demonstrate social increasing returns. Speciﬁcally, all workers are initially assumed identical, then a fraction are assumed to have a reduction in
their cost of investment in human capital. This induces ﬁrms to invest more, and thus with random matching, even workers whose cost of investment has
not changed beneﬁt from the greater investment by ﬁrms. But both at the initial and new equilibria, there is underinvestment.
4 Friction must be intermediate only in the precise sense that for ﬁxed values of the other parameters, and normalising match frictions between zero
and one, overinvestment occurs only for frictions in an open interval strictly in [0,1]. Thus, overinvestment can occur when match friction is quite close to
1, as is the case for OECD labour markets.
5 Speciﬁcally, we calibrate the match arrival rate over a month as the inverse of unemployment duration for a range of OECD countries. Combined with
an annual discount rate of 5%, this gives a range of values of the match friction parameter between 0.9 and 1.
6 For example, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) ﬁnd the private return to higher education in the US is of the order of 10% whereas Barro and Lee (1994)
ﬁnd that, unlike secondary education, higher education is not signiﬁcant in explaining the variation in international growth rates.
7 As any ﬁrm must exit matched with a worker, in any period, the measures of ﬁrms and workers in the unmatched state are the same.
8 For concreteness, think of a two-stage matching process where measure a agents on either side of the market are randomly selected from the pool
of the unmatched, and then these a workers and ﬁrms are randomly matched with each other. The existence of such procedure even with a continuum
on each side of the market is guaranteed by the arguments of Alos-Ferrer (2002).
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worker are matched, they decide simultaneously and independently whether to accept or reject the match. Should one or
both reject, then nothing further happens to these agents until the next period.
If they both accept, both permanently exit the pool of unmatched, and start production. Rather than model bargaining
over revenue explicitly, we just assume the outside option principle applies (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). That is, revenue
y(ew , e f ) is equally divided unless half of this quantity is strictly less than the payoff to continued search (say v) for one of
the two parties, in which case that party gets v and the other the residual y(ew , e f )− v . Such a division can be shown to be
an equilibrium of an explicit alternating offers bargaining game between the worker and the ﬁrm, where the responder has
the option of returning to the pool of the unmatched.9 Payoffs are assumed linear in revenues, so without loss of generality,
these quantities are also the payoffs of the two bargainers.
2.2. The revenue function
We assume that y(ew , e f ) is non-negative, symmetric, and strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable
for all (ew , e f ) ∈ 2+ , with yi denoting the derivative with respect to the ith argument. Moreover, we will assume that y is
supermodular: given differentiability, this is just the condition y12 > 0. That is, the inputs are strict complements. One class
of functions that satisﬁes all of these assumptions is the symmetric CES revenue function
y(ew , e f ) =
(
0.5eρw + 0.5eρf
)α/ρ + y0, ρ < 1, 1> α > ρ (2.1)
Note that if ρ  0, inputs are essential i.e. y(0, e) = y(e,0) = y0, all e. Moreover, ρ = 0 is the Cobb–Douglas case y(ew , e f ) =
eα/2w e
α/2
f + y0.
2.3. Strategies and equilibrium
Section 2.1 above describes a simple stochastic game. We focus on symmetric steady-state Markov-perfect equilibrium of
this game. By symmetry, we mean an agent of a given cost type behaves in the same way, irrespective of whether he is ﬁrm
or worker. The Markov property is simply that agents condition their actions only on payoff-relevant state variables, further
discussed below. The steady-state assumption says that in equilibrium, inﬂows to the pool of unmatched equal outﬂows for
each cost type. Under these assumptions, if a ﬁrm (or worker) of cost type i = l,h enters the market at t , he invests some e∗i
in equilibrium, independently of t . So, if a ﬁrm f and a worker w are matched at the beginning of period t , the only payoff-
relevant variables for this pair are (i) their two investment levels ew , e f : (ii) the distribution of equilibrium investments
across all as yet unmatched agents, which is characterised by a pair (e∗h, e
∗
l ). Perfection, or sequential rationality, implies
that an agent accepts a match at any date iff doing so gives a higher payoff than continued search.
3. Overinvestment results
To generate conditions under which overinvestment occurs, we construct a (symmetric steady-state Markov-perfect)
equilibrium where (i) matching is non-assortative (NAM) i.e. where an l-type ﬁrm accepts a match with an h-type worker
and vice versa and (ii) where, when an h-type matches with an l-type, the outside option of the l-type binds. Call such an
equilibrium an N–B equilibrium. Both non-assortative matching and a binding outside option are required in equilibrium for
overinvestment to occur, for reasons discussed in the introduction.
3.1. The N–B equilibrium
In an N–B equilibrium, the present values of expected payoffs to continued search for the two types, denoted vh , vl ,
satisfy the following dynamic programming equations in the limit as  → 0:
rvl = aλh(vl − vl) + aλl
(
y(el, el)
2
− vl
)
(3.1)
rvh = aλh
(
y(eh, eh)
2
− vh
)
+ aλl
(
y(eh, el) − vl − vh
)
(3.2)
where λl , λh are the shares of low-cost and high-cost agents in the pool of unmatched. Note that due to non-assortative
matching, these are the same as the shares of the two types that enter the pool of the unmatched in any period.
Each of these equations has the usual interpretation that the return to being unmatched (rvl , rvh) is equal to the
expected capital gain from being matched over a short time interval. In the case of the low-cost type, the capital gain is
zero when matched with an h-type (which occurs with probability aλh) because the l-type’s outside option binds, so he
9 See an earlier version of this paper, de Meza and Lockwood (2004), for a demonstration of this.
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y(el,el)
2 − vl , as
the revenue is equally divided in this case. Eq. (3.2) for the h-type has a similar interpretation, noting that when matched
with an l-type (which occurs with probability aλl) the h-type is residual claimant and thus gets y(eh, el) − vl .
Solving (3.1), (3.2) for vl , vh we get
vl = φl y(el, el)2 (3.3)
vh = φ
[
λh
y(eh, eh)
2
+ λl
(
y(eh, el) − φl y(el, el)2
)]
(3.4)
where φ = ar+a , φl = aλlr+aλl . Finally, a binding outside option for the l-type in an hl match and NAM respectively require:
vl >
y(eh, el)
2
(3.5)
y(eh, el) vh + vl (3.6)
So, given investments, eh, el , (3.3)–(3.6) fully characterise the N–B equilibrium.
It remains to ﬁnd the equilibrium investments. Suppose that an individual l agent deviates by a small amount from
equilibrium investment e∗l to e
′. Then, as his outside option continues to bind in a match with an h-type (for a small
enough deviation), his payoff net of investment costs is
φl
y(e′, e∗l )
2
− cle′ (3.7)
So, the equilibrium investment must maximise this expression i.e. must satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition
φl
2
y1
(
e∗l , e
∗
l
)= cl (3.8)
where y1 denotes the ﬁrst derivative of y. By the same argument, if an individual h agent deviates by a small amount from
equilibrium investment e∗h to e
′ , he is still residual claimant in a match with an h-type (for a small enough deviation), so
his payoff net of investment costs is
φ
[
λh
y(e′, e∗h)
2
+ λl
(
y
(
e′, e∗l
)− φl y(e
∗
l , e
∗
l )
2
)]
− che′ (3.9)
So, the equilibrium investment must maximise this expression i.e.
φλh
2
y1
(
e∗h, e
∗
h
)+ φλl y1(e∗h, e∗l )= ch (3.10)
Eqs. (3.8), (3.10) are thus the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for equilibrium investments.
However, some discussion of suﬃcient conditions is required. By assumption, y is strictly concave in investments, so this
might appear to ensure that (3.8), (3.10) are also suﬃcient. But, there is the additional complication that large deviations
in e away from the equilibrium level can cause the “regime” facing the deviant to change e.g. whether or not he faces a
binding outside option in a given kind of match. For example, if the l-type chooses an e′ suﬃciently below e∗l , he will face
ﬁrst a binding outside option in a match with another l, then as e′ falls further, he will face a binding outside option in a
match with an h-type, l-types will reject a match with the deviant, etc.
However, it is possible to show the following.10 For the l-type, all these regime changes make the deviant worse off,
so his payoff to (downward) deviation must be bounded above by (3.7). So, if e∗l maximises (3.7), it must certainly be a
global maximum for the l-type. A similar argument implies that an h-type’s payoff to (upward) deviation must be bounded
above by (3.9). So, if e∗h maximises (3.9), it must certainly be a global maximum for the h-type. So, to conclude, the N–B
equilibrium is fully characterised by (vl, vh, e∗l , e
∗
h) that satisfy (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.8), (3.10).
3.2. Overinvestment
As payoffs are linear in revenue shares, the natural eﬃciency criterion is the sum of the payoffs to search net of invest-
ment costs, which we call aggregate surplus. In N–B equilibrium, aggregate surplus can be written as:
W
(
e∗h, e
∗
l
)= λhvh + λl vl − λlcle∗l − λhche∗h
= λhφ
[
λh
y(e∗h, e
∗
h)
2
+ λl y
(
e∗h, e
∗
l
)]+ λlφl(1− λhφ) y(e
∗
l , e
∗
l )
2
− λlcle∗l − λhche∗h (3.11)
10 These claims are more formally proved in an online Appendix in the Supplementary material and also available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/
economics/staff/academic/lockwood.
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∗
l , and collecting terms,
we get:
1
λl
∂W (e∗h, e
∗
l )
∂el
= λhφ y2
(
e∗h, e
∗
l
)+ (1− λhφ)φl y1(e∗l , e∗l )− cl
= λhφ y2
(
e∗h, e
∗
l
)+ φl[0.5− λhφ]y1(e∗l , e∗l ) (3.12)
where in the second line, we have used (3.8). So, investment of the l-types is locally too high if the term on the right-hand
side of the second line of (3.12) is negative. Inspection of this term, using y1(e∗l , e
∗
h) = y2(e∗h, e∗l ) from symmetry of the
revenue function, gives the following result.
Proposition 1. In N–B equilibrium, e∗l is locally too high i.e.
∂W (e∗h,e
∗
l )
∂el
< 0, iff (i) λhφ > 0.5; (ii) investments are suﬃciently comple-
mentary i.e.
y1(e∗l , e
∗
l )
y1(e∗l , e
∗
h)
>
λhφ
φl[λhφ − 0.5] (3.13)
The reason why condition λhφ > 0.5 is required is fairly intuitive. First, it is more likely to hold, the higher λh , as then,
the higher is the negative ﬁscal externality imposed on the h-types by l-types’ choice of el . Second, it is more likely to hold
the higher φ, as the higher φ, the more likely are hl matches.
Condition (3.13) can be explained and interpreted as follows. First, it is easy to show that e∗l > e
∗
h in equilibrium.
11 So, as
y12 > 0 by assumption, y1(e∗l , e
∗
l ) > y1(e
∗
l , e
∗
h). Now, as φl < 1, the right-hand side of the inequality in (3.13) is, by deﬁnition,
strictly greater than 1. So (3.13) simply requires that y1(e∗l , e
∗
l ) be suﬃciently larger than y1(e
∗
l , e
∗
h) i.e. complementarity in
investments has to be suﬃciently strong for overinvestment. The intuition for this is as follows. For the standard hold-up
reason, we know that there is too little investment in an ll match, so overinvestment requires that the marginal product
of el must be low enough in an hl match. As the only difference between the two types of match is that eh is lower, the
complementarity requirement follows.
So, generally, an overinvestment equilibrium will exist if (i) all the conditions for N–B equilibrium exist, and (ii) the con-
ditions in Proposition 1 hold. We now wish to obtain conditions in terms of underlying model parameters for which these
conditions hold simultaneously. To do this, some simplifying assumptions are required. We make two such assumptions.
A1. h-types face a cost of investment that is prohibitively costly i.e. ch = ∞.
A2. The revenue function is CES with ρ  0.
The main simpliﬁcation with A1, A2 is the following. First, A1 implies e∗h = 0, and A2 then implies that y1(e∗l , e∗h) =
y1(e∗l ,0) = 0, as y(e,0) ≡ y0, all e. Thus, (3.13) in Proposition 1 automatically holds, and so overinvestment occurs, as long
as λhφ > 0.5. Next, as y1(e∗l , e
∗
h) = y0, conditions (3.5)–(3.6) reduce to the condition that y0 in (2.1) lie in a certain interval.
Finally, given the assumption of CES revenue, e∗l can be solved for explicitly. These facts can all be combined (see Appendix)
to prove the following result:
Proposition 2. Assume A1, A2. Then, if λhφ > 0.5, and
b+ = κφ
1/(1−α)
l
(1− φl) > y0c
α/(1−α)
l >
κ0.5θφ1/(1−α)l
1− 0.5θφl = b
− (3.14)
where θ = 1−φ+φλh1−φ+0.5φλh , κ = ( α2 )α/(1−α) > 0, then there exists an overinvestment equilibrium. There is always a non-empty set of
parameters for which there exists an overinvestment equilibrium. For any ﬁxed values of the other parameters, an overinvestment
equilibrium exists if match frictions are “intermediate” i.e. φ lies in an interval strictly in [0,1].
Note that the conditions for existence of an overinvestment equilibrium are given entirely in terms of parameters φ,
λh (or λl), α, cl; in particular, the precise elasticity of substitution between inputs, ρ , does not matter, as long as it is
non-positive. The concavity of the production function, as measured by α, does matter, however.
Proposition 2 says that overinvestment equilibrium always exists for some set of parameters. To get us a feel for how big
this set of parameters is, we turn to numerical simulations. Our numerical simulations, reported in Fig. 1 below, proceed as
follows.
First, we wish to choose ranges of parameter values which are “realistic” for our main application, the labour market. We
begin with the match friction parameter, φ = a/(a + r). In the model, in steady-state equilibrium, a is by deﬁnition equal
11 For suppose not i.e. e∗l  e∗h , but continue to assume that l-types have a binding outside option i.e. (3.5) holds. Then y(e∗l , e∗l ) < y(e∗h, e∗l ), and moreover,
vl must be less than (due to match frictions) a weighted average of 0.5y(e∗l , e
∗
l ) and vl itself. Thus, vl < 0.5y(e
∗
h, e
∗
l ), contradicting (3.5).
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to the ﬂow (over time period ) of agents exiting from the pool of unmatched, divided by the stock of unmatched. So,
1/a is equal to the average time to ﬁnd a match. Empirically, this corresponds to average unemployment duration. Typical
unemployment durations measured in months for OECD countries range between 14 months (France) and 3 months (the
US), with an average for Europe of about 6 months (Pissarides, 2007). Taking the time period  as a month, this suggests a
range of values for a of 1/3 to 1/14.
Next, following Pissarides (2007), we choose an annual discount rate of 5%, implying a monthly discount rate of
ln(1.05)/12 = 0.0041. Overall, this gives a range of values of φ, 0.934–0.987, i.e. indicating that according to this mea-
sure, the labour market is close to frictionless. So, we shall let φ range between 0.9 and 1. Nevertheless, as we shall see, for
reasonable values of the other parameters, it is possible to ﬁnd overinvestment.
The other parameters here are α, the returns to scale of the production function, and λh . These are much more diﬃcult
to calibrate from labour market data. First, on α, even if there are constant returns to all inputs, the investments considered
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to IT training, for example, computer hardware, by ﬁrms) so α could be quite small. We let α take on the value 0.5. Finally,
for λh , we need λh > 0.5/φ for φ  0.9, i.e. λh > 0.55. So, we let λl = 1− λh range between 0.04 and 0.44.
Figs. 1(a)–(c) graph b+ , b− as functions of the match friction parameter φ = aa+r , which must lie between 0.9 and 1.
Speciﬁcally, Figs. 1(a)–(c) show φ along the horizontal axis, and b+ , b− on the vertical axis. The set of parameter values
satisfying (3.14) is shown by the shaded area in each case. So, from Proposition 2, the set of parameter values for which
overinvestment equilibrium exists is just the shaded area. Generally, we see that for every conﬁguration of parameter values
illustrated, this set is non-empty. In several cases, this region is quite large, verifying our claim that overinvestment is a
realistic possibility in the labour market.
Figs. 1(a)–(c) also show what happens as the fraction of low-cost investors λl increases. This clearly increases the size of
the shaded area. This is because the higher λl , the higher the value of the outside option of an l-type when matched with
an h-type, and so the more likely it is that the outside option of an l-type will bind in a match with an h-type i.e. that
equilibrium condition (3.5) holds. Other things equal, this makes an overinvestment equilibrium more likely.
Finally, we turn to the important fact, stated in Proposition 2, that for any ﬁxed values of the other parameters, an
overinvestment equilibrium exists if match frictions are intermediate i.e. φ is in an interval strictly in [0,1]. First, how can
that be reconciled with Fig. 1, where φ can take on very high values? Simply ﬁx a point on the vertical axis and there is
always an interval on the horizontal axis that generates coordinates in the shaded area. So, “intermediate” in Proposition 2
has a very precise meaning; it does not mean, for example, that values of φ in the middle of the feasible range [0,1] i.e.
around 0.5 always generate overinvestment.
Second, why are “intermediate” frictions required for overinvestment? The reason is that an N–B equilibrium only occurs
with intermediate match frictions. Match frictions must be low enough to ensure that the l-type’s outside option is binding,
but must be high enough to ensure that matching is non-assortative. Moreover, the only way in which overinvestment can
arise is in N–B equilibrium, and thus a necessary condition for overinvestment is that match frictions are intermediate.12
4. Discussion
Here we discuss some possible extensions and empirical implications of the model. One concern is that in the model, the
matching process is entirely random, whereas in reality, labour market search is at least partially “directed” i.e. workers can
apply to particular ﬁrms, and ﬁrms can accept applications only from particular workers. Here, we sketch how our model
can be extended to allow for directed search,13 and argue that our results are robust to a certain amount of “direction” in
the search process.
An interpretation of our matching technology is that over a time interval , a fraction of a of ﬁrms and workers are
drawn at random from the pool of unmatched, and then matched randomly with each other via an employment agency of
some kind. We now modify this as follows. We suppose that low-cost types can express a preference to the agency for the
type they wish to be matched with. An l-type will always wish to be matched with another l-type, as strict complementarity
implies that total revenue from the match will be higher, and thus half the revenue from that match exceeds what the l-
type could get in a match with an h-type, whether or not his outside option binds. We also suppose that the agency only
meets the l-type’s request with probability p, and matches him randomly with probability 1 − p, with p thus measuring
the eﬃciency of the agency.
So, the probability, conditional on being matched at all, that an l-type is matched with another l-type is θl = p + (1 −
p)λl = λl + pλh , and the probability, conditional on being matched at all, that an h-type is matched with another h-type
is θh = λh + pλl . So, when p = 0, we have random matching, and when p = 1, we have θl = θh = 1 i.e. perfectly directed
matching. Then, in (3.1), we replace λl, λh by θl , 1− θl respectively and in (3.2), we replace λl , λh by θh , 1− θh respectively.
Then, the analysis proceeds as before, and it can be shown (details on request) that if p is not too high, an overinvestment
equilibrium can exist as before. In this sense, our results are robust to the introduction of directed search.
Now we turn to empirical implications. In some respects, our matching model ﬁts the facts better than does signalling
theory. For example, Sicherman (1991, p. 114) reports that “Workers who are working in occupations that demand less schooling
than they actually have (overeducated) get higher wages than their co-workers (holding other characteristics constant) but lower wages
than workers with similar levels of schooling who work in jobs in which their schooling equals that which is required.” This is exactly
the pattern predicted by the matching approach. Moreover, signalling theory is based on the proposition that education
sorts, whereas the dispersion in matches indicates that to a considerable extent it fails to do so.
The theories also have different implications for how the growth in the numbers of graduates impacts on the level of
wages. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) document that in the US and elsewhere that an upsurge in the number of graduates
12 A formal proof that underinvestment occurs with any other kind of equilibrium is provided in de Meza and Lockwood (2004). The idea is that there
are only two other possibilities; (i) assortative matching, where by deﬁnition, the outside option cannot bind, and (ii) non-assortative matching, with non-
binding outside options. In either case, there is no rent-shifting incentive for investment. In addition, if the return to the unmatched state occurs randomly
via stochastic match break-up in equilibrium, there is always underinvestment.
13 For other models of directed search, see e.g. Moen (1997), Albrecht et al. (2006).
510 Notehas been associated with falls in the absolute wage of non-graduates.14 If we interpret the ex ante investment in our model
as the acquisition of higher education, our rent-transfer effect provides an explanation of the facts that does not rely on
asymmetric information. In our model, an increase in the number of low-cost investors (those willing and able to invest
in higher education) increases the outside option of these investors and thus reduce the wages of non-investors (non-
graduates). So the absolute wage of non-graduates will be lower in an equilibrium with high numbers of graduates, as the
evidence suggests. In contrast, the separating equilibrium of signalling theory implies that the least educated are paid their
intrinsic productivity, so an increase in the number of more educated workers would not depress their wages.
5. Related literature
We are aware of two papers that consider ex ante investments followed by competitive, or frictionless, mechanisms for
pairing or matching agents (e.g. ﬁrms and workers): Cole et al. (2001) and Felli and Roberts (2002).15 Cole et al. (2001)
consider a matching model in which buyers and sellers make investment decisions non-cooperatively prior to entering a
frictionless matching and bargaining process that is modelled as a cooperative game. The outcome of this second stage
is constrained to be “stable” i.e. there is no pair of agents that by rematching and appropriately sharing the resulting
surplus can both be strictly better off than in the equilibrium. Felli and Roberts (2002) analyse a frictionless model with a
ﬁxed number of heterogeneous buyers and sellers, and investment only by one side of the market. Following investment, a
Bertrand-style game is assumed where ﬁrms bid for workers (or vice versa). Both these papers ﬁnd examples of equilibria
with overinvestment.
But, we would argue, these examples have important limitations. In Felli and Roberts (2002), unlike in our model, the
agents invest eﬃciently, conditional on the match that they anticipate. But, relative to the ﬁrst-best, overinvestment by – for
example – a relatively low quality worker is possible, because he anticipates being hired by a very high-quality ﬁrm. There
is no general tendency to overinvestment or underinvestment.
In Cole et al. (2001) Proposition 5 states that equilibrium investments with stable matching are at a local maximum of
net surplus (the revenue from a match minus investment costs, S = y(ew , e f ) − c(ew) − c(e f ) in our notation). So, if S is
concave, the unique equilibrium investments with stable matching are the eﬃcient investments that maximise S . So, their
example of overinvestment with a continuum of agents relies on S being non-concave.16 In contrast, our model has a well-behaved
concave revenue function; overinvestment is due to a different mechanism.
Moreover, in their model, typically there are multiple stable equilibria to the postinvestment game, and thus multiple
equilibria overall, which may generally involve underinvestment, eﬃcient investment, or overinvestment. In their cooperative
framework, without an explicit bargaining model, they have no criterion for selecting among these equilibria.
6. Conclusions
A recent literature examines agents’ incentives to make investments prior to entering a stochastic matching process
and bargaining over the surplus. In these models outside options do not bind, investors are held up and thus will under-
invest in equilibrium. We have shown that this ﬁnding is not robust. If agents are heterogeneous, outside options inﬂuence
investment incentives. This effect mitigates underinvestment, and even allows overinvestment to arise. Simulation results
indicate that empirically, parameters may be in the overinvestment zone. Unlike the signalling model, the matching model
is consistent with ﬁndings that workers often take jobs for which they are overqualiﬁed, earning more than less qualiﬁed
peers but less than if they were they to hold jobs for which their qualiﬁcations are required.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 2
Note that as y(eh, el) = y(0, el) = y0, conditions (3.5) reduce to 2vl > y0. Moreover, using (3.3), (3.4), (3.6) can be written
y0 
(
1− φ + φλh
1− φ + 0.5φλh
)
vl ≡ θ vl (A.1)
So, from (A.1), the condition for the binding outside option and non-assortative matching conditions to be satisﬁed together
become
2vl > y0  θ vl (A.2)
14 Acemoglu’s explanation is that with more graduates available, ﬁrms ﬁnd it worth creating jobs speciﬁcally for graduates. The implication is that there
should be a strong positive correlation between the number of graduates and GNP.
15 Cole et al. (2001) is less closely related to our work, as it assumes a ﬁnite number of agents. In this case, the decision of any two agents to match has
an external effect on the opportunities available to other agents, so the set-up is a bit different.
16 In our notation, their example is
y(ew , e f ) =
{
ewe f , ewe f  0.5
2(ewe f )2, ewe f < 0.5
which is clearly not concave.
Note 511Now from the CES assumption (2.1), we have
y(el, el) = eαl + y0 = A + y0 (A.3)
Combining this with (3.3) gives vl = 0.5φl(y0 + A). But then, assuming y0 > 0, (A.2) reduces to
φl A
1− φl > y0 >
0.5θφl A
1− 0.5θφl (A.4)
Finally, el satisﬁes the FOC (3.8):
αφl
2
(
eρl
)α/ρ−1
eρ−1l = cl 	⇒ e∗l =
(
αφl
2cl
)1/(1−α)
So,
A = (e∗l )α = κ
(
φl
cl
)α/(1−α)
, κ =
(
α
2
)α/(1−α)
> 0 (A.5)
and thus, combining (A.4), (A.5), we need
κφ
1/(1−α)
l
(1− φl)cα/(1−α)l
> y0 >
κ0.5θφ1/(1−α)l
(1− 0.5θφl)cα/(1−α)l
which gives (3.14). Finally, we need to prove that for any ﬁxed values of the other parameters, an overinvestment equilibrium
exists if match frictions are intermediate i.e. φ is in an interval strictly in [0,1]. First, as φ → 1, 0.5θ,φl → 1 also, so that
b+ , b− → ∞, so that for φ close enough to 1, any ﬁxed y0cα/(1−α)l < b− , so no overinvestment equilibrium can exist for φ
close enough to 1. Second, as φ → 0, φl → 0, so b+,b− → 0, so that for φ close enough to 1, any ﬁxed y0cα/(1−α)l > b+ , so
no overinvestment equilibrium can exist for φ close enough to 0. 
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